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Prologue
A momentous question
In producing a new Defence White Paper in 2009, the Rudd Government 
finds itself addressing a momentous question at an awkward time. The 
question is how China’s rise affects Australia’s long-term security. If it 
is addressed squarely, the question has large and unsettling implications 
for every aspect of Australia’s strategic posture, including our alliances, 
partnerships and regional diplomacy. Most importantly for the Defence 
White Paper, it may have major implications for the kinds of armed 
forces Australia needs.1   
There is never a good time to address questions like this, but 2009 
is proving especially awkward. The global economic crisis has made it 
harder than ever to detach long-term decisions about defence objectives 
and funding needs from short-term fiscal pressures. After a decade of 
swelling budgets, spending money on Defence has become hard again. 
At times Prime Minister Kevin Rudd probably wishes that he had left 
his Defence White Paper until his second term, as his predecessors Bob 
Hawke and John Howard did. 
Some voices in government have no doubt been suggesting that the 
whole thing should be shelved until after the global economic crisis, 
because the sharp decline in the government’s fiscal position makes it 
impossible to frame credible defence-spending projections. That is not 
necessarily true. The most important decisions in the Defence White 
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Paper concern major force-development projects that span decades and 
take several years to get moving. They would have big implications 
for defence budgets 10 and 20 years from now, but add little to this 
year’s budget and forward estimates. That means the government could 
separate, to some extent, its short-term fiscal policy and its long-term 
strategic policy. It would be possible to commit to further sustained 
increases in defence spending over the long term, and at the same time 
hold down or even cut spending in the next few years. This would be 
awkward to sell politically, and would limit future fiscal flexibility if the 
downturn proves to be longer and deeper than ministers now expect. 
But if the government is confident about Australia’s long-term economic 
prospects, it would be foolish to determine long-term defence policy to 
fit short-term fiscal problems.     
It might be tempting to think that the global economic crisis has 
shelved the question, because it has put China’s rise on ice. That would 
be wishful thinking. China’s economic growth and the present economic 
crisis operate on very different timescales. Even a severe global recession 
or depression is measured in years: China’s rise is measured in decades. 
The deeper forces driving China’s rise will most probably persist long 
after the present crisis is over. And the long-term effects of the crisis 
could amplify, rather than reverse, the long-term shift of economic, 
political and strategic power towards China.   
That historic power shift is what makes the rise of China so 
important for Australian defence policy. Other security issues may 
seem more pressing from day to day — global terrorism and natural 
disasters, Afghanistan and Iraq, Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands, 
the perennial question of Indonesia. A lot of debate about defence 
policy in recent years has focused on how we should judge their relative 
significance. But as I have argued in an earlier paper in this series,2 the 
rise of China is different from all of these. It is the issue which will 
do most to shape Australia’s strategic environment and defence needs 
over the next few decades. The prime concern is not whether China 
will pose a direct threat to Australia as its power grows. It is the way 
China’s growth is fracturing the foundations of the old Asian regional 
order which has ensured our security in recent decades, and the deep 
uncertainties about what the new order which will emerge might mean 
for our security.
From any perspective, China’s rise is the most consequential long-
term trend in the world today — economically, environmentally, 
culturally and strategically — and it probably constitutes one of the 
great transformations in history. As China’s economic weight grows 
to challenge that of America, we are probably seeing the end of the age 
of Western strategic primacy in Asia which began with the Portuguese 
over 500 years ago. The end of the Vasco da Gama Era3 has been 
prematurely predicted often enough over the last century, but never 
before on such a solid basis — the seemingly inexorable shift of sheer 
economic strength.
This time the predictions might well be right. This is especially 
significant for Australia, because our society is so much a product of that 
era. Ever since 1788, Western maritime primacy in Asia — first British, 
then American — has seemed necessary and sufficient for Australia’s 
security. We have enjoyed remarkable security since the early 1970s 
because American strategic primacy has been essentially uncontested 
by Asia’s other big powers. But that cannot last if China’s economy 
grows for the next three decades as it has for the past three. China’s 
new strength is transforming its relationships with the US and Japan, 
and in doing so it is creating a new and more competitive strategic 
order in Asia. India’s rise will eventually become a key factor too. This 
Asian Century will have profound implications for Australia’s place in 
the region, and may carry new and large strategic risks: a revolution 
comparable in its consequences for Australia to the long collapse of 
British power. 
Of course there is no certainty. We cannot be sure that China will 
keep growing over the next few decades, nor what that would mean for 
Asia’s future and Australia’s security. However, there is a strong and 
growing consensus that China’s long-term growth can and probably will 
be sustained, with immense political and strategic implications in Asia. 
Kevin Rudd certainly sees things this way. In several major speeches 
in late 2008 Rudd made it clear that he regards the rise of China as 
the single most important factor shaping Asia’s century and Australia’s 
A FOCUSED FORCE
4 5
A MOMENTOUS qUESTION
long-term strategic risks.4 How big the implications for Australia’s 
defence turn out to be depends on many things. Most of all, it depends 
on the major powers themselves. How will China use its power, and 
how will the US and Japan respond?
These are difficult questions. The major powers have immense 
incentives to preserve the peace and stability which has served them 
so well since the early 1970s. They could certainly find a way to do 
that, but they would need to build a new and quite different set of 
relationships with one another. That will only happen through careful, 
deliberate and often difficult compromise. They may fail, and failure is 
more likely if they do not realise how big the risks and consequences of 
failure are. Asia is not predestined to relive Europe’s tragic history of 
major-power competition, but neither is that fate impossible. Conflict 
is not inevitable, but history teaches how easily and how badly these 
transitions can go wrong.   
Only time will tell, but strategic policy cannot wait until the future 
is clear. Australia faces two urgent policy challenges over coming 
years. One is primarily diplomatic, the other is primarily military. The 
diplomatic task is to do whatever we can to promote the evolution 
of a new stable order in Asia that minimises the risk of conflict, and 
maximises Australia’s opportunities and options. This is arguably 
the biggest and most demanding diplomatic task Australia has ever 
faced, requiring new and sometimes unfamiliar modes of thought and 
action. The Rudd Government’s Asia-Pacific Community concept is 
perhaps a first step in the right direction, but much more will be needed 
as Australia seeks to influence and adapt to a changing Asia. This 
diplomatic challenge deserves and requires intense and detailed study. 
But it is not the subject of this paper.
We are here focusing on the second challenge, which is to respond to 
the possibility that notwithstanding our best diplomatic efforts, the new 
Asian order turns out to be more strategically risky than the old one. 
The defence policy task is to consider what kinds of forces Australia 
might need if that happens, and start to build them. This may be more 
urgent then many people assume. We do not know how quickly Asia 
might change: the region could be very different even a decade or two 
from now. Defence capability meanwhile takes a long time to build, and 
must last a long time. Decisions taken in the 2009 White Paper will do a 
great deal to determine the armed forces Australia will have in the very 
different Asia of 2040. So while there is no need yet to rush, nor is there 
time to waste. The sooner Australia can start adjusting its strategic policy 
to Asia’s transformation, the easier and less disruptive that adjustment 
will be. Ministers, therefore, do not have the luxury of thinking that 
they can leave this momentous question to their successors.
None of this will likely be news to Kevin Rudd. He would seem 
clearly to understand the significance of China’s rise, and the urgency 
of effective policy responses. Moreover he grasps the interconnections 
between defence policy and diplomacy. However, he will find it 
difficult — diplomatically, fiscally, and politically — to address the clear 
implications for Australia of Asia’s transformation. An effective policy 
response may cost a lot of money, complicate relationships with allies, 
potentially harm relations with China and require the government to 
explain complex, unsettling and unwelcome issues to the electorate. 
These are policy and political dilemmas which the White Paper will 
need to address.
This Lowy Institute Paper follows a Lowy Institute Perspective5 
published last year which explored what Defence White Papers in 
general are meant to do and how they can best do it. This paper discusses 
the specific choices and decisions that government faces in producing a 
new Defence White Paper for Australia in 2009. 
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Chapter 1
Expectations
Defence policy is hard to do well. It involves big, expensive decisions 
about very concrete questions: how much to spend and what to buy. 
One would hope these decisions could be based on clear and rigorous 
judgements concerning the kinds of threats we might face and the best 
way to use armed force to meet them. But such judgements – especially 
when they project, as they must, several decades into the future — are 
always uncertain. We simply cannot know much for sure about future 
risks and how to manage them, so we have no choice but to base big 
and expensive decisions on sands of uncertainty. This gives defence 
policy its perennial challenge; to build a coherent, rational, defensible 
linkage between the dimly-seen risks of the distant future and the all-
too-concrete choices that need to be made today.6 
This is clearly the challenge that the Rudd Government faces as 
it produces its new Defence White Paper in 2009. Ministers cannot 
bridge the gap between uncertain risks in the distant future and urgent 
choices today simply by writing an essay on Australia’s strategic 
future, by making a wish list of new equipment the military would 
like, or by promising to spend a particular amount of money. They 
will need to build a sustained, coherent argument that recognises 
the inevitable uncertainties and does everything possible to assess 
future risks, set strategic objectives, identify military options, define 
A FOCUSED FORCE
8 9
ExPECTATIONS
capability priorities, and commit future funding. And all over a 
timeframe measured in decades.
This is time-consuming work. Governments often say that security 
is their top priority, but ministers seldom spend the time and attention 
required to do defence policy well. Instead they rely on their professional 
advisers, civilian and military, to advise them. To those immersed in 
the day-to-day business of defence, short-term management will always 
loom larger than the long-term questions on which major strategic 
decisions should hinge, and in the short term it is always easiest to 
stick with what we are already doing. So, by default, ministers tend to 
be advised to keep things largely as they are, and they tend to take that 
advice. They stick closely to what their predecessors did — as we can 
see from the fact that the Australian Defence Force has changed little in 
essential structure over the past 40 years.
They could do worse, of course. Change for its own sake is not good 
policy, especially in defence, where the accumulated legacies of past 
decisions last a long time. There are, therefore, deeper explanations for 
policy continuity than ministerial inattention. The Rudd Government 
inherits both a huge stock of existing military capabilities, and a big 
order-book for new equipment that is yet to be delivered. In theory 
there is no reason why the government could not jettison some of this 
inheritance; indeed, willingness to consider doing so is one mark of 
serious defence policy. But the huge investment in current forces and 
new projects means there is a strong incentive to conclude that the 
capabilities we already have in service and on order are just what are 
needed to face the strategic challenges of the next few decades.
On the other hand, governments are usually eager to persuade the 
electorate that the country faces new threats and uncertainties. This 
gives defence policy an air of unreality, as ministers often tell voters that 
the country faces fundamentally transformed strategic circumstances 
and complex new risks, but then reassure them that the old forces built 
to meet the old risks will still suffice to meet the new ones. No wonder 
Defence White Papers are viewed with some cynicism by old hands 
with long memories.
The legacy of Defence 2000
For the Rudd Government the status quo is represented by John Howard’s 
White Paper, Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force.7 It bequeaths a 
complex and ambiguous legacy, quite radical in some respects and deeply 
conservative in others. Defence 2000 was radical in expanding the scope 
of Australia’s strategic objectives beyond the defence of the continent 
that had been the focus of defence policy since the mid-1970s. It did so in 
response to several trends that emerged in the 1990s, including China’s 
growing power which, even then, seemed to increase Australia’s future 
strategic risks. On the other hand Defence 2000 was conservative about 
the forces needed to achieve these expanded objectives. It concluded that 
they could be met by maintaining and upgrading essentially the same 
mix of capabilities that had been inherited from the rather different 
policies of earlier decades. Ministers declined to examine whether other 
force structures might be more cost-effective, perhaps because it seemed 
that with a few changes Australia’s old force structure could do all that 
the new objectives required, without spending a larger share of GDP on 
defence. As we will see in later chapters, that looks much less plausible 
now. 
Defence 2000 therefore bequeaths two hard questions to this year’s 
new White Paper. First, are the wider strategic objectives which Defence 
2000 set for the ADF sufficient to meet the strategic risks we now 
perceive over coming decades? Second, would the force as it has been 
planned since 2000 be able to achieve these objectives, or whatever new 
ones replace them?
Setting the bar
This helps to frame our expectations for the new White Paper. To meet 
these expectations it should address four core questions.
• Identify the big strategic trends that will shape Australia’s strategic 
environment between now and the middle of the century, and 
analyse what they mean for Australia’s future strategic risks.
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• Decide what part armed force should play in minimising and 
managing those risks, alongside other elements of policy, and 
what that means for Australia’s strategic objectives. Do we want 
to stick with the expanded strategic objectives that were adopted 
in 2000, or recast them? And what kinds of military operations 
could we employ to achieve them?
• Identify the kinds of capabilities which could most cost-effectively 
undertake the operations we need to be able to perform.
• Consider how those forces can be developed and maintained 
most efficiently, how much will they cost, and whether we are 
willing to meet that cost over the long term.
Finally, the White Paper must bring these judgements together. Effective 
defence policy consists in the alignment of these core decisions in a way 
that strikes an explicit, transparent, sustainable and defensible balance 
between judgements about future strategic risk and our willingness 
to spend money to mitigate that risk. Within broad limits, there is no 
predetermined right or wrong solution to this equation: no objectively 
correct balance to be struck. Like all such public policy decisions, the 
level at which we find equilibrium between costs and benefits in defence 
policy depends on the subjective value we place on security, and how it 
compares with the values we place on other competing goals. 
But if there are no right or wrong solutions, there are certainly sound 
and unsound ones. Sound solutions are those that are reached with 
due diligence, without evasion and obfuscation, frankly confronting 
the options and choices we face. More commonly defence policy evades 
tough issues and inconvenient facts, and ignores the inevitability 
of balance and tradeoffs. We should expect more of the new White 
Paper than that. We should expect clear answers to the core questions 
posed above, and a realistic and sustainable approach to striking the 
equilibrium between cost and risk in Australia’s defence.
Chapter 2
Strategic risks
The first step in defence policy is to identify the risks we are trying 
to manage. That takes a bit of discipline. As a community we have 
great admiration for our defence forces, and we have instinctive, even 
emotional expectations that they can and should protect us from many 
different risks. The sober reality is rather different. Armed forces 
are among our most highly specialised institutions, designed very 
specifically to use lethal force to defeat other armed forces. While they 
can do other things, their extreme specialisation means they are almost 
never cost-effective for any task in which lethal force against organised 
adversaries is not required. Many of Australia’s pressing security 
concerns are like that, and consequently armed force will not have much 
role in addressing them. It sometimes makes sense to use our forces to 
help meet other risks, but seldom to design or build them specifically to 
do so. Decisions about the kinds of forces we build should, therefore, 
focus primarily on risks to our security from the use of armed force by 
others. They are what I mean here by ‘strategic risks’.  
 Judging strategic risks over the long term is not easy. Governments 
— like the rest of us — often over-estimate the implications of short 
term events and miss the implications of big slow trends. And we 
cannot predict specific threats decades ahead. The best we can do is 
identify the current trends which seem most likely to shape the strategic 
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environment of future decades, define the range of possible futures 
which those trends might produce, and assess the range of credible 
strategic risks which could arise in them. That will frame the range of 
possible future risks that our defence policy should cover.
Within that range we need to decide which risks deserve more 
attention: the more likely ones or the more consequential? Of course 
both dimensions should enter our risk calculations, but defence policy 
does properly weigh consequences ahead of likelihood. It should 
also take a sophisticated view of likelihood. It is easy to assume that 
something very different is therefore very improbable, because sharp 
discontinuities always look unlikely before they happen. But they are 
actually quite common. Often the most important question is, therefore, 
not whether a particular contingency is likely in the circumstances that 
exist today, but whether circumstances may change in ways that would 
make it more likely in future. For example, Japan today is unlikely to 
build nuclear weapons, but quite probable changes in its relations with 
the US and China could raise that likelihood sharply. So our assessments 
need to consider how changes in the wider strategic environment may 
affect the probability of specific risks. 
Picking the trends
In the 1970s and 1980s Australian defence policy focused almost 
exclusively on one set of strategic risks — the possibility of conflict with 
Indonesia. We claimed in those days that Australian defence policy was 
not ‘threat-based’, but Indonesia seemed the only country that could 
credibly pose a military problem for Australia. The credibility of other 
strategic risks was constrained by several apparently enduring features 
of the regional order, including sustained US maritime primacy in 
Asia, little if any strategic competition between Asian major powers, 
continued stability and development among ASEAN members, 
successful decolonisation in the Southwest Pacific to create a sub-region 
of viable, harmonious neighbours, and a broad expectation that, after 
Vietnam, large-scale military interventions in other countries’ internal 
conflicts were unlikely.8 
However, in the late 1980s and early 1990s it started to seem that 
some of these stabilising factors might be less enduring than we had 
thought. Over the 1990s Australia’s assessments of strategic risk were 
increasingly influenced by newly apparent trends. Two in particular 
strongly influenced strategic assessments as the decade progressed: the 
endemic pattern of instability and fragility among Australia’s small 
island neighbours, and new dynamics in the Asian strategic order 
driven primarily by the rise of China. One of the key purposes of the 
2000 White Paper was to adjust defence policy to the new strategic 
risks implied by these trends. 
There has been a lot of debate over the past decade about which 
of these trends is more important, and about whether others matter 
more still in determining Australia’s future strategic risks. Since 2001 
most attention has been given to the emergence of global Islamist 
terrorism. For a while many people, shocked by what they had seen on 
9/11, believed that this was the most important strategic risk Australia 
would face over the next few decades. They envisaged Australia being 
drawn into a protracted and demanding War on Terror which they 
compared with World War II and the Cold War. Certainly terrorism 
remains a most serious security problem for Australia, and one to 
which governments should continue to give a great deal of attention. 
But today few would argue that it principally determines Australia’s 
future strategic risks. Serious as it is, terrorism turns out to be less of a 
threat to the global order than many had assumed, and at the same time 
other, more substantial risks have not gone away. Moreover large-scale 
military operations have not proved to be an effective way to address 
the threat. Canberra’s low-key intelligence and police support for 
Indonesian counter-terrorism efforts have done much more to reduce 
the threat to Australian nationals than have military operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.
For all these reasons, the Rudd Government seems unlikely to 
conclude that Australia’s most important strategic risks over coming 
decades will come from global terrorism.9 It is much more likely 
to conclude that Australia today faces the same principal sources of 
potential strategic risk as we did in 2000: the shifting power balance 
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in Asia, fragility in our immediate neighbourhood, and the perennial 
question of Indonesia. 
The big neighbour
 
Australian defence policy can never ignore strategic risk from Indonesia. 
Since its creation as a state, Indonesia has been, and will remain, the 
only close neighbour able to mount more than pinprick armed attack on 
Australia with its own forces. Moreover, while bilateral relations have 
usually been good in recent decades, the potential for conflict between 
two such different countries remains, and it could occur without much 
warning and independently of strategic developments elsewhere. So as 
long as US primacy could be counted on to keep Asia stable, conflict 
with our close neighbour has been the only serious conventional 
military contingency which Australia seemed at all likely to face. Most 
importantly, it was the only one we might have faced alone. That is why 
it was for so long our most critical strategic risk.
However, the scale of this risk has been limited not only by generally 
stable bilateral relations but also by the asymmetry between Australia’s 
and Indonesia’s armed forces. Indonesia has a large army and weak 
air and naval forces, while Australia has strong air and naval forces 
and a small army. Indonesia has never had the capacity to project large 
land forces across Australia’s air and sea approaches in the face of our 
maritime defences, and Australia has never had the ability to mount major 
operations on Indonesian territory against Indonesia’s army. Future 
strategic risk from Indonesia, therefore, depends on the development 
of the two countries’ forces, as well as on how the relationship evolves. 
Australia’s risks would increase sharply if Indonesia acquired air and 
naval forces that could challenge Australian control of our air and sea 
approaches.
Assuming Australia maintains current and planned capabilities, 
that would require a major expansion of Indonesia’s navy and air 
force. That depends primarily on economics. As long as Indonesia’s 
economy remains significantly smaller than Australia’s, Jakarta 
is unlikely to invest the money needed to build air and naval forces 
large enough to challenge those of Australia. But it remains possible 
that in coming decades Indonesia could establish the preconditions for 
sustained rapid growth, and then quickly overtake Australia’s GDP. 10 
If and when that happens, it would be natural for Indonesia to buy 
air and naval systems comparable to Australia’s, and eventually learn 
to operate them effectively. There is nothing inherently threatening 
about this: as countries’ economies grow they usually do spend more 
on defence, and it would make a lot of sense for Indonesia, with its 
vast and complex archipelago, to invest heavily in air and naval forces. 
Nonetheless, for Australia to lose the assurance that we could deny our 
air and sea approaches to the large land forces of our big neighbour 
would constitute a large increase in strategic risk. The seriousness of 
that risk would then depend on the tone of the bilateral relationship. 
Indonesia has undergone a remarkable transformation to democracy 
over the past decade, and that may offer hope for future harmony. 
But recent experience suggests that both sides of the Arafura Sea also 
show regrettable propensities to mutual suspicion and xenophobia.11 
Nonetheless, in the wider Asian context we have deep strategic interests 
in common. The more complex and challenging that wider context 
becomes, the easier the bilateral relationship might be to manage, and 
the more important it is that it should be managed well.        
The fragile neighbours
Australians have got used to worrying about our small neighbours, 
and for good reason. Many of them are poorly governed, economically 
stagnant and politically fragile, with state institutions which cannot 
deliver the basic services essential to individual welfare and economic 
growth. These are obviously serious problems, with grave consequences 
for the welfare of their citizens. But how do they pose strategic risks for 
Australia? We can answer that question in two ways. In the first place, 
Australia has repeatedly committed its armed forces to help address 
these problems in places like Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands, 
and is likely to find itself in similar situations again. It could, therefore, 
make sense to take this probability into account when designing our 
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forces. But when we look deeper and ask why Australia has accepted 
these commitments, other considerations come into play. Australia’s 
concern for the stability of its small neighbours is not just a matter 
of simple philanthropy. Deep-seated strategic interests are engaged as 
well. Since the mid-19th century Australians have often feared that the 
islands to our north could offer bases from which larger powers could 
threaten us, and that is again becoming an issue for Australia as Asia’s 
strategic future seems less certain. So assessments of how these weak 
neighbours affect Australia’s future strategic risks need to consider two 
separate questions: over the next three decades, how likely are they to 
sink further towards full-scale state failure, and how much would that 
increase the probability that outside powers would intrude?   
The first of these questions is difficult to answer. Many of our 
neighbours have appeared to be on the brink of collapse for years, but 
they somehow seem to keep muddling along and occasionally even 
make some welcome progress. There is a significant chance that they 
will keep doing this for years to come. On the other hand there is a clear 
danger that one or more of them could suffer major crises that threaten 
their viability as states. The Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste have 
each experienced such crises in recent years. In each case protracted 
Australian military-backed interventions have been needed to avert the 
threat of major state failure. These problems may recur in more serious 
forms in these places, or spread to others. Most seriously, there is a 
clear risk that the South Pacific’s largest states, PNG and Fiji, could 
experience catastrophic crises over coming decades, which might only 
be contained if there was a major Australian-led military intervention. 
Whether this kind of major local crisis would pose wider strategic 
risks to Australia depends on the situation elsewhere in Asia. As 
long as relations between Asia’s major powers remain harmonious, 
we have little to fear from intrusions into our backyard. But if Asia’s 
major powers become strategically competitive, the likelihood and 
consequences of intrusion would rise swiftly. 
The Asian century 
   
We have seen that Australia’s strategic risks close to home over the 
next few decades will depend a lot on how the wider Asian strategic 
environment develops. In these indirect ways, and directly through the 
implications for the kinds of conflicts Australia might find itself drawn 
into, the most important determinant of Australia’s future strategic risk is 
the evolution of strategic relationships among Asia’s major powers. And 
the key trend driving change in those relationships is the rise of China.    
It is now almost 20 years since Australian defence policymakers 
started to consider what China’s rise might mean for the stability of 
Asia’s international order, and hence for the nature and scale of future 
strategic risks to Australia.12 Since then the issue has steadily moved 
to the top of the agenda. As we have seen, Kevin Rudd regards the rise 
of China, and the implications of that rise for relations between Asia’s 
major powers, as the most important factor shaping Australia’s long-
term strategic risks. Today most people in the strategic and defence 
policy community would probably agree. But what do we really mean by 
this? Kevin Rudd sometimes speaks as if the key concern is the growth 
of China’s military capability, and especially its air and naval forces, 
which might, he implies, be used to attack Australia or its interests.13 
That is a concern, but it is not the most important way in which China’s 
growing power affects Australia’s long-term strategic risks. 
China’s growing power over coming decades may increase the 
chances that we could find ourselves meeting direct Chinese military 
pressure. But it also, and more importantly, increases the probability 
of wider conflicts in Asia in which Australian strategic interests would 
be strongly engaged, and to which we therefore might feel compelled to 
commit strong forces. The changing balance of military power is only a 
symptom of a much deeper shift in the balance of economic and political 
power. That is changing the way Asia works, away from a system which 
has proved remarkably harmonious and stable towards something more 
risky. China’s rise is undermining the old order in Asia, but China 
might not be solely responsible for any resulting turmoil. Indeed in 
some circumstances we could conceivably find ourselves aligning with 
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China against some other source of instability. Many things now highly 
unlikely could be possible in Asia’s uncertain future.
China is not the only country whose power is growing: India too 
seems set to take its place as a major Asian power. When that happens 
it will be impossible to speak of a separate East Asian strategic system, 
but only of a pan-Asian one in which India plays a full role along with 
China, Japan and most probably the US. But that is in the future: India 
is perhaps a generation behind China, so China’s rise carries greater 
implications for regional order over the next few decades than India’s. 
Moreover China’s rise challenges the current regional order much 
more directly, partly because of its proximity to, and relationship with, 
Japan, which carries such immediate implications for the US in Asia. 
It is the close interconnections among China, Japan and the US which 
make China’s rise so strategically important, and so complex to manage. 
China’s rise is transforming the fundamental power relativities among 
these three major powers, and hence inevitably the way they interact 
with each other.
That matters to Australia because for the last 40 years Asia’s stability 
and Australia’s security have been underwritten by a set of stable 
relations between the US, China and Japan. This has been so much part 
of the fabric of Asian stability since Nixon’s opening to China in 1972 
that we tend to take it for granted. But in fact it has been a remarkable 
achievement. For almost four decades, both China and Japan have 
accepted American strategic dominance of Asia, and have been willing 
to shape their own policies and expectations to accommodate and 
support it. This era of uncontested US primacy has been the bedrock 
of Australia’s security and fundamental to our defence policy since 
the end of the Forward Defence era, because it limited our strategic 
risks and hence our defence needs. As long as relations between Asia’s 
major powers remained stable, Australia only needed forces to meet 
any local threat from Indonesia, and provide modest support to the US 
in coalition operations. This provided the essential preconditions for 
Australia to build what we called a self-reliant defence policy in the 
1970s and 1980s, which narrowly focused our forces on the defence of 
the continent against local threats. American primacy made Australia’s 
policy of defence self-reliance possible, because it limited both the scale 
of military support that we might need to provide the US in Asia, and 
limited the range of strategic risks we might have to handle ourselves 
without US support. That meant that the military forces we needed to 
achieve ‘self reliance’ were small and cheap.  
All this is challenged by China’s rise. Of course that trajectory is not 
inevitable. China faces immense challenges — economic, political, social 
and environmental — which could slow or even stop the growth of the 
past three decades. But we can no longer assume, as we have perhaps 
tended to do until recently, that there is some kind of inherent self-
limiting mechanism which will prevent China growing strong enough to 
challenge US primacy. Only in the last few years have we really come to 
appreciate the obvious fact that if China grows for the next 30 years as 
it has done since 1978, it will overtake America to become the strongest 
economy in the world.14 Even now we have not yet absorbed how real 
that possibility is, and how momentous a change it would be.  
For many people — and not only Americans — it seems almost 
unthinkable that after 130 years America might no longer command 
the largest economy on earth. They assume that America can bounce 
back from present troubles, and again confound predictions of decline. 
If the main sources of today’s power shifts were America’s economic 
and strategic problems in the Middle East and on Wall Street, their 
confidence would be justified. America remains an extraordinary 
country, and it can and will overcome its current problems. But that 
will probably not be enough to reverse the long-term shift in power that 
is reshaping Asia. The roots of that shift lie not in America’s weakness 
but in China’s strength, and they reflect deep historic trends. The 
underlying cause is China’s transformation into a modern economy 
in which individual productivity starts to approach the levels of the 
industrialised world. The process of creating the political preconditions 
for this transformation began over a century ago, and the transformation 
itself has now been running for 30 years. If it continues, the laws of 
arithmetic come into play: the narrower the gap in productivity, the 
more important the difference in population. Once they are playing 
anything like the same game, 1.2 billion eventually beats 300 million.
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As China’s economic power approaches America’s, the balance 
of strategic and political power in Asia must shift too. Other factors 
may help sustain American leadership, including formidable armed 
force and abundant soft power, but surely the deepest foundation of 
American strategic primacy is its sheer economic weight. And China’s 
power is focused on Asia, while America’s is spread around the world. 
China has no need to beat the US globally in order to match it in Asia. 
The implication for Australia is stark, and a little frightening. There is 
a clear probability that within a few decades — a timeframe relevant 
to the new Defence White Paper — the US will no longer exercise 
uncontested strategic primacy in Asia. What happens then? Much of 
course depends on how China uses its growing power. But America’s 
and Japan’s responses are equally important. All three major powers 
face the challenge to build a new set of relationships that can sustain 
the peace of the past 40 years as the power relativities between them 
change.15 How do they do that?
Beijing’s aims are easiest to judge. It wants Asia to be stable and 
peaceful, but does not think US leadership is essential for that. Chinese 
leaders no doubt envisage a new stable order in Asia based on Chinese 
leadership, and will cautiously but persistently try to bring it about 
by maximising their power and influence vis-à-vis the US. America’s 
response is less clear. There are broadly three possibilities. Least likely, 
but not impossible, the US could slowly allow its influence in Asia to 
decline, and leave it to the remaining major powers — China and Japan 
at first, later India and perhaps others — to sort out a new regional 
order without it. More likely, but still far from probable, the US could 
decide to share power in Asia with China and Japan. It could foster 
the creation of a kind of Concert of Asia, in which the big three — 
later four once India becomes too big to ignore — cooperated to shape 
regional affairs. On this model, as America’s relative power waned it 
would stay in Asia to help hold the balance, and to prevent any other 
power from dominating the region, without itself trying to perpetuate 
the primacy of recent decades.
America’s third option is to meet the Chinese challenge head on, 
looking for ways to maintain strategic leadership as its economic 
primacy fades. The most obvious way to do this would be to try to 
build a coalition of regional countries — Japan, India, Australia, South 
Korea and at least some Southeast Asian states — to balance China’s 
power. Whether this could work, and how the resulting strategic 
competition would be managed and contained, are critical unanswered 
questions here, but there are signs that the US has been trying to lay 
the groundwork for this kind of coalition-building in recent years. 
And it is likely to be a path which America will stay attracted to, most 
importantly because of Japan.
The Japanese worry that as China’s power grows they get squeezed. 
They look to Washington for protection, and thus have little interest in 
the US either conceding or sharing leadership with Beijing. Japan finds 
itself in an untenable position: its security depends on a certain level of 
animosity between its two largest trading partners. The only way out of 
this trap would be to cease to rely on the US, and build an independent 
strategic posture — an immense and extraordinarily difficult step. So 
Japan will urge the US to contest China’s challenge. And Washington, 
which relies on Japan as the foundation of its Asian power, will have 
little choice but to comply. Much will then depend on how the resulting 
strategic competition is managed. All sides would have a huge interest 
in keeping it within tight bounds, to avoid disruption of the economic 
cooperation which is so important to everyone’s prosperity. But that 
would be hard to do, and there is a real risk that US-China strategic 
competition would become intense, disruptive and dangerous. That could 
happen slowly or as a result of a crisis, and not only over Taiwan.
The future of America’s role in Asia, therefore, is not a simple 
question of stay or go. America could leave Asia over coming decades, 
or it could also remain engaged in ways that are very different from 
the recent past. Either way, American leadership in Asia would be 
weaker; diluted, contested or abandoned. For Australia, that means 
our US alliance would be a declining strategic asset, as America 
became both less capable of providing help, while demanding more 
help from us. And if America chose to contest a Chinese challenge 
to its leadership head-on, Australia would face complex, costly and 
unwelcome choices. Would we cling ever closer to a weaker and more 
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demanding ally, or draw apart and lose that ally’s support in a more 
complex and dangerous region?
These sobering questions do not just pose challenges for Australia’s 
defence policy. In the first instance, they pose acute and urgent challenges 
for our foreign policy. Australia has an immense stake in the way Asia’s 
international order adapts to the changing power relativities over coming 
years. Our interest would be served by the early and orderly negotiation 
of a new order which avoided the growth of strategic competition 
between major powers through a power-sharing agreement in which 
the US remained closely engaged in Asia but shared leadership with 
China and Japan. As a self-declared ‘activist middle power’, Australia 
should be trying to promote that outcome. Australia has never had a 
higher diplomatic priority than to do whatever is possible to promote 
the emergence of a stable new regional order. The government’s Asia-
Pacific Community concept is a step in that direction, but real influence 
will only be found through forceful bilateral diplomacy in the most 
important capitals — Tokyo, Beijing and Washington.
Australian defence policy meanwhile needs to address the possibility 
that these efforts might fail. Asia’s power shifts increase greatly the 
range of strategic risks our defence policy must address, because they 
increase the probability of threats from which America’s uncontested 
primacy has shielded us. In essence, as China grows we face two kinds 
of increased strategic risk. Either we will have to do much more to 
support the US as it competes with China, or we will have to do more 
to support our own security with less US help. This is one of the great 
strategic challenges of our history.
Chapter 3
Strategic objectives
What does the forgoing analysis of Australia’s strategic risks mean for 
defence policy? That will depend on how we think military capabilities 
can be used to help to manage these risks. There are three sets of 
decisions to be made. How might strategic risks materialise? What 
roles should armed force play in responding if they materialise? And 
what kinds of operations would best fulfil these roles? These are some 
of the most important, most difficult and least-understood issues in 
defence policy. The soundness of this year’s White Paper will depend 
a lot on how well they are handled, because without clear answers to 
these questions, it will be impossible to make robust decisions about the 
kinds of forces we need.  
Concentric circles and maritime denial 
Let us start by looking back at the way these questions were considered 
in the last Defence White Paper. By 2000 it was already becoming clear 
that Australia would face greater strategic risks in the first decades of 
the new century than in the last decades of the old one. To understand 
those risks more clearly, the 2000 White Paper attempted to define 
Australia’s enduring strategic interests. The idea was to describe 
simply and clearly the features of the international environment which 
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would reflect growing strategic risk — in other words those that most 
enduringly determine the probability or seriousness of a direct attack 
on Australia.16 Protecting these interests and thereby minimising 
strategic risk can be seen as the core purpose of all strategic policy. 
Defining strategic interests carefully is, therefore, central to good policy. 
In the decades after Vietnam, Asia’s stable order supported Australia’s 
strategic interests so well that we had started to take them for granted. 
But by 2000 it was evident that we should no longer be taking them for 
granted, and the first step towards protecting them more effectively was 
to define them more carefully.17      
Defence 2000 set out to do this. It presented Australia’s strategic 
interests as a five-level concentric hierarchy in which priority decreased 
as distance from Australia increased. The hierarchy looked like this:    
• Preserve the ability to deny the direct air and sea approaches to 
the continent to any adversary.
• Prevent the intrusion of potentially hostile forces into the 
territory of Australia’s small neighbours, and preserve internal 
stability within them. 
• Prevent intrusion by an Asian major power into maritime 
Southeast Asia, or the domination of this region by Indonesia.
• Prevent the domination of Asia by any major power other than 
the US, or the disruption of Asian order by strategic competition 
between major powers.
• Support a global order which helps maintain Asian security.18
This formulation of strategic interests was integral to the White Paper’s 
overall defence-policy argument because it provided the basis for defining 
both Australia’s overall strategic aims — the full range of diplomatic 
and other measures designed to protect and promote strategic interests 
— and our strategic objectives, which define what we wanted the ADF 
to be able to do to meet our strategic aims. Strategic objectives are key 
to defence policy because they in turn defined the kinds of forces we 
needed. 19 Defence 2000 constructed a set of strategic objectives which 
specified in broad terms what the ADF should be able to do to protect 
each interest, indicating the nature and scale of military effort Australia 
wanted to be able to exert in each case. As the distance from Australia 
increased, and the priority accorded the interest decreased, the scale of 
military contribution we sought to be able to make also fell. For the first 
two levels — the defence of the continent and our closer neighbours by 
denial of air and sea approaches — our strategic objective was to protect 
our interests with independent military operations. For the lower-
priority interests, our strategic objective was to make progressively 
diminishing contributions to wider coalitions: leading in Southeast 
Asia, making a significant contribution in Northeast Asia, and only 
a modest and primarily symbolic contribution to coalitions beyond 
the Asia-Pacific.20 This was clearly a more ambitious set of objectives 
than the previous tight focus on the Defence of Australia. How much 
more ambitious it was depended on how terms like ‘substantial’ and 
‘significant’ were interpreted.    
Defence 2000 was less explicit about the kinds of military operations 
Australia could best use to achieve these strategic objectives, 
perpetuating a major gap in Australia’s defence policy throughout the 
post-Vietnam era.21 There were, however, some implicit judgements 
about operational options in the paper which were central to its broad 
force-structure conclusions, if not always to later specific capability 
decisions. First, Australia would want to be able to use its forces to 
help stabilise fragile states, both in our immediate neighbourhood and, 
in coalition with others, in more distant places like the Middle East. 
Drawing on the experience of the 1990s, operational concepts evolved 
for stabilisation operations against non-state or weak-state adversaries, 
focusing on the use of relatively light land forces working in close 
cooperation with police, aid agencies, international bodies and NGOs, 
typically in broadly-based international coalitions.  
Stabilisation operations obviously meet many of Australia’s most 
probable short-term strategic needs, but not the most important ones and 
longer-term ones. For these, the challenge has always been to find cost-
effective ways to use Australia’s limited forces to achieve a wide range 
of strategic objectives covering a vast geographical spread, and against 
some very capable potential adversaries. The approach adopted in 2000 
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was to extend an operational concept of maritime denial,22 which had 
earlier evolved for the direct defence of Australia. Recognising that the 
continent could most cost-effectively be defended at sea, it focused on 
proactively denying Australia’s maritime approaches to hostile forces. 
That word ‘proactive’ is critical: while maritime denial is strategically a 
defensive posture, it can and should be operationally offensive, aiming 
to set the pace and location of conflict, and targeting adversary air and 
sea forces wherever they can be found and reached. This operational 
approach was described as the ‘Strategy of Denial’ in the Dibb Review,23 
and ‘Defence in Depth’ in the 1987 White Paper,24 but its roots go back 
at least to the early 1960s, and for decades it has strongly influenced the 
development of ADF air and naval forces.
A core idea implicit in Defence 2000 was that the concept of maritime 
denial could be extended beyond the defence of the continent to provide 
a cost-effective operational option for achieving Australia’s wider 
strategic objectives in the Asia-Pacific. According to Defence 2000, 
Australia could defend its immediate neighbourhood from hostile 
intrusion by denying the air and sea approaches to an adversary, it 
could support the states of maritime Southeast Asia by contributing to 
the defence of their maritime approaches, and it could support the US in 
Northeast Asia by helping to dominate the Western Pacific approaches 
to the Asian continent. In this way, a single operational concept, and 
a single set of capabilities, could support all our strategic interests in 
the Asia-Pacific. Moreover, the focus on air and naval operations would 
play to Australian comparative strategic advantages in technology 
over manpower. It would also mesh with the strategic concepts of our 
allies, and make it easy to scale ADF contributions in more distant 
contingencies to match our priorities.  
Today’s choices 
The Rudd Government has important decisions to make about these 
issues in preparing the new White Paper, and several options to choose 
from. It could endorse the Defence 2000 conception of Australia’s 
strategic interests and objectives. It could set wider and more ambitious 
objectives, or narrower and more modest ones. And however ministers 
decide to define Australia’s strategic objectives, they will then need to 
decide whether to look for new operational concepts to achieve them, 
or stick with the old ones.
If ministers look carefully at whether to grow or shrink Australia’s 
strategic objectives, they will see strong arguments on both sides. 
Shrinking them would be politically unpalatable and increase 
Australia’s long-term strategic risk. But more ambitious objectives cost 
more to achieve. Especially if costs go up — as they will — it would only 
seem sensible for ministers at least to think about lowering Australia’s 
strategic sights. What are their options? History is a good guide here: 
the two most credible models of more modest strategic objectives can be 
found in Australia’s earlier defence policies — one from the 1970s and 
1980s, the other from the 1950s and 1960s.  
If money is tight, the government might be tempted to revive the policies 
of the 1976 and 1987 White Papers. This would be easy enough. A new 
White Paper could define an area of primary strategic interest covering 
Australia’s closer region — essentially Indonesia and the Melanesian arc. 
It could say that Australia needed to be able to respond independently 
to any threat to Australian territory or interests that emerged within 
that area. But it could exclude any need to respond to threats emerging 
from further afield.25 This would go beyond the policies of the 1980s by 
explicitly identifying the stabilisation of countries within our immediate 
neighbourhood as a strategic objective. But it would follow those earlier 
policies by limiting Australia’s strategic objectives beyond the area of 
primary interest to small, essentially symbolic coalition contributions 
that we could safely assume would be found from the forces required 
for local purposes. On this model, Australia’s forces could be structured 
to ensure that we could deny our air and sea approaches to Indonesian 
forces, and to undertake stabilisation operations in the small island states 
of the South Pacific. All this would cost a lot less than forces needed to meet 
the wider strategic objectives identified in 2000. But it would only make 
good strategic sense if one assumed that a US-dominated regional order 
would last indefinitely, and that Australia need not maintain a significant 
capacity to support it militarily. That does not seem credible today.  
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The other way to define a narrower set of strategic objectives would 
be to revert to something more like the Forward Defence polices of the 
1950s and 1960s. On this model, Australia would redefine its strategic 
objectives solely in terms of supporting the US. It could then develop 
operational options that would concentrate solely on, and therefore 
expand, the contributions we could make to US-led coalitions, usually in 
the form of expeditionary land forces. Jim Molan has recently proposed 
something along these lines.26 His concept would provide more support 
for the US than the first alternative sketched above, and thus might 
seem more suited to an era in which the US might face greater strategic 
challenges in Asia. But the kind of support envisaged in Molan’s 
proposal would not be much use to the US in meeting Asian strategic 
challenges over coming decades: they will be very different from those 
of the 1950s and 1960s. And more seriously still, adopting this model 
would be a major gamble that energetic and unquestioning support for 
the US would be all that Australia needed to do to protect its strategic 
interests over coming decades. That would be a brave bet in 2009.    
Not surprisingly, these two examples suggest that moving back to a 
narrower set of strategic objectives only makes sense if our concerns 
ease about Asia’s strategic future. Unfortunately the government’s own 
assessments of strategic risk seem to push in the opposite direction. If 
the strategic implications of Asia’s transformation were serious enough 
back in 2000 for John Howard to expand Australia’s strategic objectives 
as far as he did, how much more serious do they seem today? Ministers 
now will need to consider whether the objectives set in 2000 are 
ambitious enough to manage Australia’s future strategic risks as we now 
perceive them. Possibilities that were only seen dimly in 2000 are now 
more starkly clear. Back then we did not acknowledge the probability 
that within a few decades China might actually overtake the US 
economically. We did not expect China’s air and naval forces to develop 
so swiftly, to the point that already they significantly limit US military 
options off China’s coast. We did not foresee the huge and draining 
commitments America has undertaken in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 
what they would show us about the limits to American power. The 
seriousness and the imminence of the challenge to US primacy is today 
clearer than it was nine years ago, so the likelihood of tectonic change 
in Asia’s strategic order is higher, and so are the consequent strategic 
risks for Australia.
To see the implications for the way we define Australia’s strategic 
objectives, consider what Australia might want to do in the event of 
US conflict with China over coming decades if the balance of power 
between them shifts in China’s favour. In 2000 we said that Australia’s 
strategic objective would be to be able to provide ‘significant’ support 
to the US in this kind of situation. What that meant was not precisely 
defined, but it is clear enough. We’d send more than the kind of 
essentially symbolic ‘niche’ contribution that we have sent to successive 
conflicts in the Middle East over recent decades, but far less than a full-
scale commitment of Australia’s strategic resources. In short, it would 
be something like what we did in Korea or Vietnam. Would that be 
sufficient to meet Australia’s interests if America’s position in Asia was 
really under threat in 2025 or 2035? Would Australia want to be able to 
do more, by sending forces that could make a substantial contribution 
— by which I mean, make a real difference to who won — or more 
modestly, envisage sending forces that only made a difference to how 
easily they won?
These questions are hard to answer without delving more deeply into 
the circumstances of the conflict itself. What would count as ‘winning’ 
in a war between two such different powers as the US and China? How 
much influence would Australia want to have over America’s war aims 
and plans? And of course, most importantly, would we want to support 
the US at all in these circumstances? Whichever way we answer this 
question, the implications are momentous. If Australia chose to support 
the US, we would want to do it in a big way, aiming to make a real 
difference both to the conduct of the war and to the shape of what 
followed, because having made that choice our future would be utterly 
tied up in the outcome. If Australia chose not to support the US, we 
could assume that henceforth we would be on our own.        
The sober contemplation of the strategic choices Australia might 
face in the Asian century suggests that the strategic objectives set in 
2000 may not be sufficient to support Australia’s strategic interests 
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and manage our strategic risks over the next few decades. To explore 
how they might be revised, we would need to consider how Australia’s 
national strategic posture might be reconfigured if five centuries of 
Western maritime primacy in Asia are really coming to an end. This 
would involve a fundamental review of Australia’s wider strategic aims, 
into which strategic objectives must fit. Would we seek to build new 
alliances with one or more great and powerful friends, this time in Asia? 
Try to forge a coalition for collective defence against China or some 
other aspiring hegemon? Or retreat to strategic isolation on a fortress-
continent? These are big questions, which need to be considered if 
Australia is to make sense of its strategic future in an Asian century 
very different from anything we have known before. The answers 
would provide a new set of strategic aims which would guide diplomatic 
efforts to shape Australia’s emerging strategic environment to minimise 
our risks and maximise the chances of peace and stability. Eventually 
Australia’s strategic objectives must be re-framed to support whatever 
new strategic aims we adopt. But setting new strategic aims goes beyond 
the scope of this paper, and of the new White Paper as well.
However this does not mean we cannot reach at least some working 
conclusions about the demands which credible alternative strategic 
aims might place on us. Any posture that requires Australia to be able to 
undertake more than symbolic military operations against major power 
adversaries would demand much more of Australia’s forces than our 
defence policy had envisaged in the 1970s, 80s and 90s. The strategic 
objectives set out in Defence 2000 are, therefore, an absolute minimum 
for Australia if we want to retain what I have called elsewhere ‘the 
independent strategic weight of a middle power’.27 My sense is that 
Australians would want to do that, if we can. The alternative is to adopt 
New Zealand’s strategic posture, without New Zealand’s confidence in 
a geographically close and relatively powerful ally. It may come to that, 
but I do not think Australians should choose to go that way until they 
have considered more carefully what options there might be to avoid it.   
So how do we proceed for the time being? It is reasonable to assume 
that however our national strategic posture might evolve, the ideas that 
have emerged over the past 20 years will inform any new conception of 
strategic interests and objectives, and therefore provide a good basis for 
choices about the forces we should build in the decades ahead.
Operational options
The first step in deciding what forces can most cost-effectively meet any 
given set of strategic objectives is to decide how armed force can best be 
used to achieve them. What operational options should we prepare to 
employ? The question for the new White Paper is, therefore, whether 
there are better, more cost-effective alternatives to the stabilisation and 
maritime denial concepts that underpinned the 2000 White Paper. 
Stabilisation operations have been intensively studied in recent years, 
as we have learned tough lessons from Iraq to the Solomon Islands about 
the limitations of armed forces in pacifying and rebuilding dysfunctional 
societies. The general conclusions are clear: that the military effort must 
be integrated with a much larger civil effort, that military forces must 
move about among the people, and that special skills and capacities very 
different from those of conventional conflict are needed. These ideas are 
hardly new, and they have proved easier to formulate than implement. 
Moreover recent experiences and setbacks should also lead to some 
deeper reconsideration of the value of stabilisation operations. Already 
we can see some retreat from the unrealistic expectations of the 1990s 
and early 2000s about the ability of outside armed forces, even when 
fully integrated with civil agencies, to address the political, social and 
economic sources of state weakness and dysfunction. What we learn 
over the next few years about the durability of recent apparent successes 
in Iraq, and the trajectory of the current intervention in Afghanistan, 
will do much to influence future attitudes to stabilisation operations, 
including in Australia. For the time being there seems no alternative for 
Australia but to sustain the current kinds of stabilisation operations in 
the immediate neighbourhood. But it is quite possible that the vogue for 
armed interventions will prove to be transitory, or at least that ambitions 
will be scaled back from the sometimes rather grandiose aspirations of 
recent years. As we shall see, all this will have implications for the way 
the government thinks about the future of Australia’s land forces.    
A FOCUSED FORCE
32 33
STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
There is a quite different kind of debate about the future of maritime 
denial as the operational foundation for Australia’s other strategic 
objectives. This area of defence policy has not been well studied for 
many years, but recently several serious efforts have been made to 
explore how Australia might handle the risks of the Asian Century 
by identifying more cost-effective military ways to achieve strategic 
objectives, especially against major-power adversaries. These provide 
interesting alternatives to the maritime denial concepts underpinning 
the 2000 White Paper. Allan Behm hints at an operational concept 
he calls ‘decisive lethality’, focused on the leadership and command 
structures of a potential adversary.28 In a telling image, he likens this 
to the way a blue-ringed octopus attacks the nervous systems of much 
bigger prey. Ross Babbage has proposed that Australia should adopt 
what he calls a ‘flexible deterrent’ posture, essentially a conventional 
version of a classic ‘deterrent by punishment’ strategy. In the spirit of 
de Gaulle, he has proposed that Australia should develop the capacity to 
‘rip the arm off’ a major Asian power — in other words, be capable of 
imposing costs on a major adversary that outweigh any possible benefit 
from attacking us.29 
These are both important contributions to the debate, but I think they 
both fail to offer a more cost-effective alternative to maritime denial. 
Attacking leadership and command networks, as Behm suggests, is an 
attractive idea, but the closer one looks the harder it becomes. Leaders 
are hard to find, easy to protect, and can often readily be replaced. 
Command structures are easier to target, but they too are easy to restore 
or replace, at least after a day or two. Leadership and command targeting, 
therefore, has most effect at the tactical level when minutes count: at 
the strategic level it is seldom effective. Moreover, it is a game that two 
can play: a subtle form of implicit mutual deterrence seems generally to 
have inhibited the use of decapitation as an operational option. 
Babbage’s concept also has much to commend it, but suffers from the 
problems characteristic of deterrence in other contexts. First, deterring 
a major power through threat of punishment is hard to do. Babbage 
suggests that a force capable of achieving his deterrent objectives might 
need to include 300-400 JSF aircraft, 20-30 submarines, or ‘exceptional’ 
cyber attack and cyber defence capabilities in order to threaten enough 
damage to deter a major power. But even these forces would probably be 
insufficient: experience in the last century suggests that major powers 
are capable of absorbing truly immense amounts of damage before 
desisting from strategic aims they have set themselves, and of course 
they have ways of deterring us from inflicting serious damage on them 
as well. So it is far from clear that Australia could afford a conventional 
force large enough to achieve reliable deterrence against a major Asian 
power, and doubtful that deterrence in this form would be more cost-
effective than maritime denial. Secondly, although Professor Babbage 
calls his posture ‘flexible’, I’m not sure that it is flexible enough. A force 
designed for deterrence of major attack on the continent might lack 
the capacity to respond proportionately — and therefore credibly — 
to lesser but still serious challenges to Australia’s interests. We would 
risk spending a lot of money on a force which might leave many of our 
interests without credible protection.30
This brief discussion does not by any means exhaust the analysis 
needed of alternative operational options for achieving Australia’s 
strategic objectives. There may be other viable and potentially cost-
effective operational options that should be considered, and more 
work should be done to explore them. On the one hand, the future of 
stabilisation operations cannot be taken for granted: current operations 
will have much to teach us about how armed forces can best be used to 
refashion weak states, and whether they should even try. However, for 
the time being governments will need to decide whether they stick with 
the current model, change it, or abandon such operations altogether. 
The first option seems by far the most likely.    
On the other hand, although maritime denial has deep roots in 
Australian strategic thinking, there remain about it some important 
questions to be addressed. It has some evident limitations. It does not fit 
traditional, ANZAC-inspired ideas of the ‘Australian Way of War’, and 
abandons ambitions to be able to end conflicts decisively by invading 
and occupying the territory of an adversary. But is our traditional way 
of war — sending armies to help distant allies — what we need in the 
new century? And would it ever make sense for Australia, or our allies, 
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to build a strategic posture around Euro-centric continental concepts 
of absolute victory in maritime Asia? The closer one looks, the more it 
appears that, while maritime denial has limitations, it fits Australia’s 
comparative advantages, offers better economy of effort and resources, 
has a better chance than alternatives of being operationally sustainable 
over coming decades as regional maritime forces increase, and fits the 
probable operational concepts of friends and allies. I would conclude 
that the government must adopt a clear operational concept for major 
regional conflicts as the basis for its force planning, and maritime denial 
is the best we have.  
Hedge or fudge
No government likes to take hard decisions if they can be avoided, and 
there are at least two ways that Kevin Rudd might seek to avoid the 
tough choices about policy fundamentals which we have been exploring 
in this chapter. The first is to hedge, by trying to defer decisions until 
things become clearer. The government could argue that there is no 
need to decide yet whether Australia needs to reformulate its strategic 
objectives in response to Asia’s transformation, because we do not yet 
know if and how that will happen. Unfortunately this is probably only 
half true. Yes, the future remains uncertain. But that does not mean we 
can afford to delay decisions about how we respond until everything 
becomes clear, because by then it will be too late. For example, on 
present plans it would take 30 years to expand our submarine force to 
12 boats. Even if we start now we would be lucky to have major new 
capabilities in service by the time China starts to overtake the US as 
the largest economy in the world. This suggests that, while it would 
certainly be worth exploring options for rapid implementation of later 
decisions, we cannot simply assume it will be possible. The experience 
of the past many decades suggests that if we might need new kinds of 
capability in 30 years’ time, we had better start planning them now.
The last option of course is to fudge, and Rudd and his colleagues 
would hardly be human if they did not find this an attractive possibility. 
They will surely be tempted to equivocate about what Australia’s 
strategic objectives should be, and how they should be achieved. That 
is, after all, what most governments do most of the time. It offers a 
way to avoid tough choices between increasing long-term strategic risks 
by cutting strategic objectives, and increasing the Commonwealth’s 
fiscal burden by increasing long-term defence funding. But of course 
these choices must be faced explicitly and unflinchingly. It’s not just an 
abstract matter of good government, but a very concrete requirement 
for cost-effective defence policy. Australia does not have an easy 
strategic situation. Managing strategic risk over coming decades will 
be demanding, and we will need to spend every dollar as effectively as 
possible. That will only be achieved if we have a very clear idea of what 
we need to be able to do with armed force and how we intend to do it, 
because only then can we build the capabilities to meet our needs most 
cost-effectively. Without rigorous and explicit decisions about interests, 
objectives and operational priorities, any defence capability plan is just 
a wish list.             
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Chapter 4
Beyond the balanced force
It is time to start looking at capabilities. In the previous chapter I 
suggested that the least the government should do in its new White Paper 
is to commit to building forces that can achieve the strategic objectives 
set out in the 2000 White Paper through stabilisation and maritime 
denial operations. The next issue, therefore, is what capabilities that 
requires us to build. The simplest way to start is to ask how well today’s 
force, and today’s plans for its future development, measure up against 
those strategic objectives. This chapter looks at this question. The 
answer is not reassuring. There is a big gap between Australia’s present 
and projected forces and the tasks they are now supposed to be able to 
perform, and that gap will most probably grow over coming years. There 
are three simple reasons for this. Back in 2000 we underestimated what 
was required against the strategic trends as they were seen at the time. 
Since 2000 the strategic circumstances have become tougher, faster 
than expected, and seem likely to continue to do so. And third, since 
2000 some seriously mistaken decisions have wasted a lot of money 
on capabilities that do not contribute cost-effectively to Australia’s 
operational priorities, imposing significant opportunity costs and 
reducing our capacity to achieve strategic objectives. 
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Stabilisation missions 
Let’s look at how Australia’s forces measure up against current 
objectives in more detail, starting with stabilisation missions. In 2000 it 
was concluded that an army with a core of six full-time, high-readiness 
infantry battalions would be sufficient both to lead stabilisation 
operations in the immediate neighbourhood and to contribute small 
contingents to more distant coalition operations. It was also assumed 
that the army could at the same time retain the critical skills, training 
and equipment needed for the more intense land warfare that might 
be required to support maritime denial operations in a conventional 
conflict. Since then Australia has found itself undertaking longer, larger 
and more demanding stabilisation operations than we had expected. 
Tasks have grown incrementally without clear strategic rationales being 
articulated or priorities being set. We have been drawn into substantial 
and open-ended commitments to policing missions in Timor-Leste and 
the Solomon Islands, and into protracted and dangerous operations in 
Afghanistan. Commitments have grown without consideration of their 
implications for the Army’s training, equipment and doctrine, and 
consequently for its capacity for more conventional combat. The limits 
to Australia’s willingness to intervene in a major breakdown of law 
and order in somewhere like PNG, Timor-Leste, or Fiji — never well-
defined — have become very indistinct. 
It was partly in response to these pressures that the previous 
government decided to raise an extra two infantry battalions in 2005. 
But even with eight battalions, the lessons of the past few years have 
very uncomfortable implications. Australia today lacks the land forces 
to achieve decisive results even in the modest objectives we have set 
ourselves in places like Timor-Leste. We could probably respond 
effectively to an attempted coup in Port Moresby in which several 
hundred members of the PNGDF supported a violent overthrow of 
the elected government. But we do not have military options available 
to respond to a major breakdown of law and order in any substantial 
area of PNG. For example, we would be little better placed today than 
we were at the time to provide a military option to respond to a crisis 
like the one in Bougainville in 1989. Nor could we provide an effective 
military response to a serious crisis in Fiji, or to a widespread collapse 
of law and order in Timor-Leste — even with the upper levels of New 
Zealand and other regional support.
The reason is simply that we have too few troops for these tasks. 
Stabilisation operations take a lot of people on the ground. How many 
people we could deploy from our current force is always difficult to 
estimate. Much depends on luck, and willingness to run some risks. But 
as a rough indication, even with eight battalions, Australia would today 
be hard-pressed to deploy more than about 3000 troops to a major crisis 
in our region for a short deployment of up to a few months. And even 
if we abandoned other operations — always an option in a crisis — we 
could not surge more than 6000 troops. With luck we might expect to get 
another 1500 troops from regional friends. But that would not be enough 
to deal with the kinds of quite credible major problems sketched above. 
Moreover, there is a second issue to consider. The more we use the 
Army for stabilisation operations, and the more we optimise it for those 
operations, the further it will evolve from the kind of force that can 
operate effectively against conventional military forces. This is an issue 
which armies themselves have been a little reluctant to address. Keen 
to retain their traditional focus on conventional conflict, but also eager 
to prove their value in stabilisation operations, they have tended to try 
to downplay the tension between the two roles. But a force optimised 
to undertake stabilisation operations cost-effectively will be trained, 
equipped and organised differently from one optimised for medium- 
to high-level conventional conflict. An army that is designed primarily 
for stabilisation operations will slowly but surely take on many of the 
attributes of a constabulary, and lose the ability to prevail over other 
conventional armed forces. That suggests we cannot assume that the 
land forces we build for one task will be perfectly adequate for the other. 
So we face some tough choices about the future of our land forces. In 
the next chapter we will explore what these choices might be in more 
detail, but it is important to note here that the answer is not necessarily 
to build a bigger army. As we suggested in Chapter 3, it might be 
better to rethink our objectives and operational options. First, do we 
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understand the proper role of armed force in stabilising places like PNG 
and Timor-Leste? It always seems easy and strong for a government to 
send in the army to deal with trouble in the backyard, but armies tend 
not to be the best way to deal with many of the security issues we face 
there, and the security problems themselves are always only a symptom 
of deeper social, political and economic problems. So before expanding 
the army we should explore other, possibly more effective, ways to help 
stabilise our nearer neighbours. Secondly, we should ask just how big 
a stake we really have in the stability of our neighbours. It is one thing 
for John Howard and Kevin Rudd to declare that Australia’s interest 
and responsibilities require us to ensure that they do not fail as states, 
but what if that turns out to require our Army to be two or three times 
the present size?   
Maritime denial
 
Nine years ago the government believed that the air and naval forces 
which Australia had built over the preceding few decades to achieve 
maritime denial of our direct approaches from Indonesia could 
also, if steadily updated and with a few significant but incremental 
improvements, achieve the much more ambitious strategic objectives 
set out in the 2000 White Paper. Back in 2000 it seemed credible that 
Australia could, with a little effort, retain a decisive technological edge 
over the forces of major Asian powers like China. That would ensure 
that the ADF could defend Australia’s and our small neighbours’ air 
and naval approaches against the forces that a major Asian power 
could project and sustain in our neighbourhood,31 and that we could 
contribute strategically significant forces to coalition operations further 
from home. Today it does not look credible that on current plans we 
would have that capacity in a decade or two. Australia’s air and naval 
forces face much more demanding future operational circumstances 
than were envisaged in 2000.    
Take combat aircraft, perhaps the most critical capability for maritime 
denial operations. Back in 2000 the decision was taken to replace the 
F-111 and F-18 fleets with fifth-generation aircraft in the belief that 
this would restore, for some decades to come, Australia’s traditional 
level of superiority in air combat and strike over any credible adversary, 
including China. There has been a lot of debate in recent years about 
the adequacy of the JSF when matched against the Russian-designed 
aircraft that are forming the basis of China’s growing airpower. Many 
claims made on both sides of that debate would seem exaggerated, or at 
least hard to validate, and I will not attempt to adjudicate the issue here. 
But it is worth stressing that to restore the wide margin of superiority 
in the air that Australia has traditionally enjoyed, or at least believed 
we enjoyed, it is not enough to have an aircraft and a system which is 
just as good as a potential adversary’s: it needs to be much better, and 
we need to have a high level of confidence that it will stay much better. 
The recent debates have at least raised doubts that the JSF will deliver 
and sustain that level of superiority over its 30 or 40 year service life. 
If those doubts prove justified, the 100 aircraft that seemed sufficient 
in 2000 to meet Australia’s needs would not be able to do the job in 
future. We would need more aircraft, or better aircraft, or both, to meet 
our strategic objectives.
The same is true at sea. Nine years ago it seemed credible that the 
kind of air-warfare destroyers that the US had been building for several 
decades could operate effectively against Chinese and other emerging 
Asian maritime forces. That is now much more doubtful. Current 
and future growth in anti-ship missile and submarine capability has 
increased the risks to surface ships operating against Chinese and other 
regional forces sharply, and will continue to do so over coming decades. 
There is now real concern in the US about the capacity of the PLA to 
pose an unacceptable risk to US carriers and other surface ships in the 
Western Pacific over coming decades. How much more serious is this 
risk for Australia’s ships? The same trends have serious implications for 
the adequacy of our submarine capability. The Collins remains a highly 
capable boat against any regional adversary, but the growth of Chinese 
forces (among others) both increases the demands on our submarines 
as surface ships become more constrained, and increases the risks to 
them. The confidence we had back in 2000 that six submarines would 
be enough now looks misplaced.                
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The balanced force
 
So here is the simple truth: the force we are building today will not be 
able to achieve the strategic objectives that the previous government 
set for Australia, and that the present government could well adopt. 
That has profound implications for the way we define our strategic 
objectives and develop our defence forces. If we want to sustain the 
strategic objectives adopted in 2000, Australia will need to significantly 
expand both its land and maritime forces. If it is not willing to do that, 
it will need to scale back its strategic objectives, and accept significantly 
increased strategic risks. So in the end it comes down to a simple trade-
off between cost and risk. But in making that trade-off, we have stronger 
incentives than ever before to ensure that the money we spend is applied 
as cost-effectively as possible to achieving the strategic objectives we 
have set. And that requires a major change to the way we have done 
defence planning for the past few decades.  
The basic structure of Australia’s armed forces has changed little over 
the past 40 years. The foundations of that structure were laid in the 
early 1960s, when Menzies responded to the first serious doubts about 
the Forward Defence posture by acquiring new capabilities that could 
defend Australia against Indonesian threats without relying on the US 
or UK. As the concepts of ‘self-reliance’ and ‘the defence of Australia’ 
were developed in the 1970s and 1980s, the rationale for this kind of 
force was refined and elaborated, but the force itself changed little. This 
was not necessarily a bad thing. The force had been designed to meet 
the relatively small local threats that Australia might need to face alone 
within an international order in Asia dominated by our major ally, and 
to provide options for modest, essentially symbolic support for that ally 
in more distant conflicts. As long as American primacy lasted, it limited 
the scale of threats we might face alone, and the scale of support we might 
need to offer the US. And as long as that lasted, the kind of forces we 
started to build in the 1960s would continue to do what we needed.
Habit is powerful. After 40 years the basic structure of the 
ADF today is deeply entrenched in the institutional mind-sets and 
aspirations of the armed forces, the expectations of the public and the 
working assumptions of the politicians. The status quo is idealised as 
‘The Balanced Force’ by the defence establishment, and we can assume 
that the government today is being strongly advised to stick with it. 
They will be tempted by this advice. Any change would create losers 
among the three services, and within each service. The government 
would need to make hard choices, and explain those choices to the 
public by acknowledging frankly the dynamics of Australia’s long-term 
strategic situation and the implications for force structure and defence 
budgets. Ministers may well be reluctant to take all this on, preferring 
to believe instead that the defence establishment centred on Canberra’s 
Russell Hill knows best, and that what has worked in the past will keep 
working in future.  
In fact the Balanced Force will continue to be an adequate, if not 
necessarily cost-effective, force structure for Australia as long as the 
future looks like the present and the recent past. The attraction of the 
Balanced Force is that it has a bit of everything, which means it can do 
a bit of anything. That is called ‘flexibility’ by its proponents. But in any 
highly-specialised business — and modern combat is very specialised 
indeed — flexibility across many roles is always bought at the price 
of capacity and effectiveness in any one of them. The Balanced Force 
lacks the capacity to do enough of any one thing to achieve a decisive 
strategic result independently. But the more Asia and America’s role in 
it change, the more inadequate the Balanced Force will become.
Doing better 
The problem is not new. The reassuring conclusions of the 2000 White 
Paper were in part a result of the previous government’s reluctance 
to consider how the ADF should be changed to match the strategic 
objectives it had adopted. Fearing criticism from the military and the 
defence lobby if any existing capabilities were cut, it chose instead to 
maintain the Balanced Force indefinitely, grafting a few new capabilities 
onto it, without reviewing the adequacy and cost-effectiveness of the 
foundation on which it was building. That was a serious policy failure. 
The challenge for the new government in the 2009 Defence White 
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Paper is to remedy this failure and transform the Balanced Force into 
what one might call a Focused Force32 — focused on the capabilities that 
can most cost-effectively achieve Australia’s strategic objectives. This is 
not easy. Designing a Focused Force requires clear strategic objectives 
and operational priorities, and it also requires tough decisions about 
the capabilities that will achieve them most cost-effectively. There are 
significant risks in this: we might misjudge the strategic objectives 
we will want to achieve, or the best way to achieve them. One of the 
strongest arguments in favour of sticking with the Balanced Force is 
that it avoids those risks by avoiding the choices. But in avoiding those 
risks it runs others, much more serious: that the Balanced Force will 
prove inadequate if ever put to a major test.  
Chapter 5
Capability choices
Now at last the rubber meets the road. We have considered how Australia’s 
strategic risks are evolving, what that means for the strategic objectives of 
our armed forces and how they might be used to achieve them, and how 
our current and planned forces measure up to the resulting demands. 
We are now in a position to consider what forces Australia should be 
building to meet the strategic risks we have identified. 
Army
It has been clear since at least 2000 that the Australian Army should 
be built primarily to deploy overseas, not to fight on Australian 
territory. But the big question remains: what is it meant to do overseas? 
Stabilisation operations or conventional wars? Support the US or fight 
independently? Ideally it should be able to do all these things, but as 
always the government will face a choice between flexibility and capacity. 
Big investments in equipment and skills for heavy combat will preclude 
the larger troop numbers required for major stabilisation tasks, and 
vice-versa. The Balanced Force has tried to avoid these choices, leaving an 
army which has neither the combat weight for a significant contribution to 
a major war, nor the numbers to meet government objectives for stabilising 
our neighbourhood. Some choices should now be made.        
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If we want to focus the ADF on the strategic objectives we have 
identified, the choices are clear but not easy. Land forces do not have 
a primary role in our maritime denial operational concept. Few would 
suggest that we do not need some residual capacity for conventional 
land warfare, but the primary function for Australia’s land forces 
over coming decades will be stabilisation operations, especially in the 
immediate neighbourhood. The key factor in developing Australia’s 
land forces will, therefore, not be combat weight, but size. The White 
Paper, therefore, should give priority to expanding the size of the 
deployable and sustainable light forces, and to hold, or even diminish, 
the investment in heavier capabilities.
One should not take this logic too far, of course. Capability planning 
should always aim to achieve decisive superiority in any engagement. 
Our land forces need protected vehicles and potent firepower to 
ensure they can manage credible tactical situations against both 
insurgent forces and the lighter conventional forces they might meet 
if stabilisation operations escalate. 33 But decisions about how much 
to spend on protection and firepower need to have a realistic eye to 
cost-effectiveness: it is hard to argue that Abrams tanks are more cost-
effective in providing protection and firepower to dispersed stabilisation 
operations in Australia’s immediate neighbourhood than a larger 
number of lighter armoured fighting vehicles and armed helicopters.
This means that the government’s most important decisions about 
developing the army concern the size of its deployable forces. There are 
several elements to this. First, the number of active full-time infantry 
battalions. At present the army is building to eight battalions (up 
from four a decade ago), but as we have seen, this number is probably 
inadequate to meet credible demands arising from our current strategic 
objectives. The government can find more battalions in several ways. 
One easy way is to shift the Air Force’s Airfield Defence Regiment into 
the army. Maintaining a separate force solely to defend airfields might 
make sense in some strategic circumstances, but not in Australia’s. 
Another way is to increase the proportion of the army’s present regular 
strength posted to the battalions. This is harder: it would require 
deep rethinking of the army’s organisation and culture, and some 
compromises. If, however, the government is serious about maximising 
Australia’s capacity to support stability in our neighbourhood, there are 
some real opportunities here. A third way is to make more use of reserves. 
This is an old idea: for decades governments have hoped that part-time 
soldiers would be a cheap way to build larger deployable forces. Some 
valuable progress has been made in removing barriers to effective use of 
the reserves on routine operations, but results remain a long way below 
expectations. The heart of the problem is the regular army’s attitudes 
to part-timers. It is as if, 60 years after their establishment, Australia’s 
regular forces still fear that effective reserves are a threat to the rationale 
for maintaining a full-time regular army. Only strong leadership from 
government and within the army will shift this mindset.34
How many battalions do we need? This is not a precise science. If 
the government is willing sharply to limit its objectives in Australia’s 
immediate neighbourhood, accepting that we will not be able to use the 
ADF to respond to major crises, it could stick with eight battalions. If 
it wishes to sustain the kind of role that John Howard and Kevin Rudd 
have claimed for Australia in our neighbourhood, then I would venture 
the estimate that 12 battalions is the minimum. How should they be 
equipped? Heavier capabilities like tanks and medium artillery should not 
be a priority, and might best be entrusted to the reserves. Large numbers 
of lighter protected vehicles like Bushmasters and Australian Light 
Armoured Vehicles (ASLAVs) are a priority, and so is the agile, flexible 
firepower provided by armed helicopters and portable precision-guided 
munitions. Clearly, these forces need the transport, logistics and support 
infrastructure required to sustain extended operations in remote and 
underdeveloped environments, but at the operational tempo characteristic 
of stabilisation operations rather than the much more demanding tempo 
of high-intensity continental conflict these could be cost-effectively 
contracted to commercial providers in many circumstances.
Finally, we should mention the priority for amphibious capability. In 
the 1970s and 1980s, when the army was built to fight on Australian 
soil, there was little need for it to deploy by sea. But in the 1990s, as 
Australia’s regional role expanded, investment in amphibious capability 
grew too. The priority was to ensure that light forces could be moved 
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swiftly around the Southwest Pacific, and be supported in operations 
against light adversaries like insurgents. But in 2003, during the brief 
heyday of the Bush Doctrine, the Howard Government made some major 
decisions which would only make sense if Australia placed priority on 
capability for amphibious assault against highly-capable conventional 
forces. It invested well over $2 billion in two very large amphibious 
ships — LHDs. Designed for major assaults, they are much bigger than 
required for stabilisation operations, which can be as effectively and 
more cheaply supported from ships half the size. Buying more of such 
smaller ships would make better sense, because low-level amphibious 
support and lodgement is a priority, whereas high-level amphibious 
assault is not.35 In higher-level conflicts Australia could not project 
significant strategic weight by launching our small army on amphibious 
operations against major adversaries. In lower-level operations, a larger 
number of smaller ships would suit us much better. If the government 
is serious about cost-effective defence, it will review the LHD project 
before too much steel is actually cut, and look at building more smaller 
ships, including fast catamarans, instead.       
Navy   
A navy focused on achieving the government’s long-term strategic 
objectives would be built primarily to play a cost-effective part in 
maritime denial operations against highly capable adversaries, either 
alone in Australia’s closer region, or with allies in the wider Asia-
Pacific. That means a navy designed for what the naval strategists call 
‘sea denial’. Let’s examine this concept. Sea denial aims to prevent an 
adversary using the sea for his purposes, but it does not aim to secure 
the sea for one’s own purposes. That more ambitious goal is called ‘sea 
control’ — the ability to operate surface ships without unacceptable 
threats from an adversary. Ambitious navies like to aim for sea control, 
which is the raison d’être of conventional surface fleets. But sea control 
is hard to do against a capable adversary — much harder than sea-
denial — and it will become much harder still over coming decades, as 
many countries, including China, increase their sea-denial capabilities. 
In fact, even the US may well lose the ability to achieve sea control in 
the Western Pacific in the face of Chinese sea-denial capabilities. On 
present trends, Australia will soon have no chance of achieving sea-
control even in its own immediate neighbourhood against a concerted 
sea-denial campaign by a major Asian power. Fortunately, to achieve 
our strategic objectives through maritime denial operations, Australia 
does not need to achieve sea control, but only sea denial. That means it 
makes no sense for Australia to build forces optimised for sea control.
This has big implications for the navy. Within the Balanced Force, 
the navy’s fleet has developed in a rather haphazard fashion, without 
coherent strategic or operational rationale. The result is a mix of sea-
control and sea-denial assets. The surface fleet consists of a reasonable 
number of small warships that have the capacity to exercise a degree 
of sea control against the very weak naval and air forces of Indonesia. 
The rationale for seeking to achieve such sea control has never been 
established, beyond postulating a strategically-dubious need to assert 
right of passage through the Indonesian archipelago. The navy’s surface 
ships have almost no capability to operate independently against the 
more capable forces of a major Asian power and little capacity even to 
contribute to a coalition force.36 The six Collins submarines provide a 
potent sea-denial capability able to operate anywhere in the Asia-Pacific 
against any adversary, but their small numbers preclude them having a 
substantial strategic impact. With a relatively large number of relatively 
incapable warships, and a very small number of very capable submarines, 
the fleet reflects the defects of the Balanced Force at its worst.
In future the overriding aim of our naval forces should be to help 
deny the sea approaches to Australia and our close neighbours to hostile 
forces, and to contribute to larger coalition sea-denial operations further 
afield in the Asia-Pacific. The consequences for the navy’s force structure 
are stark. Abandoning sea control for sea denial means a decisive shift 
away from a navy focused on surface warships to one which gives a 
strong priority to submarines. Surface ships are sea-control platforms, 
both because they are the most effective way to establish sea control, 
and because they require sea control to be able to operate safely. This 
poses an intense dilemma for surface warship operations: most of their 
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effort is devoted to defending themselves, by attempting to establish the 
sea control required for their own survival. And over coming decades, 
as air and submarine capabilities in the Asia-Pacific improve, this will 
become ever harder, leaving surface ships little time and capacity to do 
much else.
This does not mean that the navy should abandon surface warships 
altogether. The regional stabilisation tasks which are central to the 
army’s mission have implications for the navy too. We need to be able 
to project modest levels of naval power in our close neighbourhood to 
support land forces, and for that we need a fleet of small warships. As 
it happens, the ANZAC-class ships built in the 1990s are well suited 
to this role. They also provide useful contingents for low-level naval 
operations in the Gulf and elsewhere. Maintaining a fleet of 8-12 
ANZAC-size ships, and taking reasonable steps to improve their anti-
submarine warfare capabilities, makes good sense. Planning to replace 
them with a much more capable and expensive ship would not.  
Tougher questions face the government over the project they have 
inherited to build three Air Warfare Destroyers (AWDs) for over $8 
billion. Their cost is driven by systems to defend themselves and other 
ships against relatively high levels of air attack. It is a risky project, so 
these systems may not work, but even if they do the ships will remain 
very vulnerable to submarine attack, in an era when submarines 
seem sure to proliferate throughout the region. Ten years from now it 
seems unlikely that any government would risk putting the AWDs to 
sea against a capable submarine-equipped adversary. Moreover, there 
would be little reason to, because they would have no cost-effective 
role in sea-denial operations. Indeed, their only clear function would 
be to try to protect the LHDs and their precious cargo of soldiers. 
But in the kind of high-level conflict in which the AWD’s expensive 
defences would be of any use, the risks to both escort and amphibious 
ships from submarines would most probably be considered prohibitive, 
and the strategic value of the tiny land forces they could deploy and 
sustain would be negligible. Thus the AWDs have no serious strategic 
purpose which remotely justifies their expense.37 We should hope that 
the government does not agree to buy a fourth AWD on top of the three 
already on order. Indeed, it is not too late to cancel the whole project, 
and invest instead in more submarines.
Submarines are the core of an effective naval sea-denial capability, 
because they have a formidable capacity to sink ships, while being 
themselves very hard to find. They have many offsetting disadvantages. 
They are little use for anything except sinking ships, and thus do not 
contribute to lower-level operations. They travel slowly and need a lot 
of luck and skill to find their targets. They are expensive and demanding 
to build and operate. But they offer massive asymmetrical advantages 
to relatively weak naval powers against strong ones. They can move 
throughout the region from bases in Australia, and operate with relative 
impunity close to the territory, and under the airpower, of an adversary. 
So they provide critical operational options to impose high costs and 
risks on an adversary at long distance.
These reasons led Australia to make a major investment in world-class 
submarines when we built the six Collins boats in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Despite some real problems, they have matured to become a very capable 
boat. But the first Collins will reach the end of its service life in 2025, 
and decisions will be made soon about replacement submarines. This 
is one of the most important defence decisions the present government 
will face over the next decade. There are lively and important debates 
underway about the size and capability of the new boats, but the really 
critical question is about numbers. Even if well maintained and fully 
manned, a fleet of six boats will have only four or five in service at any 
one time, and the arithmetic of transit and recuperation times means 
that even in major conflict Australia would never have more than one 
or two submarines on station in the most important potential target 
areas. This is not a strategically effective force in the circumstances that 
Australia might well face in coming decades.
How many submarines do we need in future? At this point the logic 
of our defence-policy argument about the implications of Australia’s 
changing strategic environment brings us to conclusions which are 
unsettling, but inescapable. If Asia’s rise transforms Australia’s 
strategic risks, and we believe that Australia should be able to protect 
its interests as that transformation unfolds, then some of our capability 
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needs will be transformed too — especially those that are most critical 
to the key operational concept of maritime denial. It is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that Australia will need a lot more submarine capability in 
future. In my view, Australia should soon start steadily to expand the 
submarine force to 12 boats, and eventually to 18. These numbers are 
startling at first glance, but they reflect a new and very different force 
structure focused on new and more demanding strategic risks. 
The government appears to understand some of this, and may well 
propose a gradual expansion of the submarine fleet, but they will 
probably want to take it slowly. One plausible idea, for example, would 
be to launch six replacements as the six Collins-class boats pay off, 
and then build another three or six boats after that. But assuming one 
boat is launched every 18 months, Australia would not get its seventh 
operational submarine until 2035 and its 12th around 2042. We might 
need them long before then. A much better approach would be to build 
a new class of six boats between now and 2025, based on the Collins 
design. Then build replacements for the six Collins, and then another 
six boats for a total of 18.
Air Force
The government’s choices in the new White Paper about the future of 
air force capabilities are simpler, but not easier, than those concerning 
the other two services. For the navy and the army, today’s Balanced 
Force reflects deep uncertainties about the operational purposes those 
services are meant to fulfil. For the air force the operational purposes are 
clear and agreed, but the implications for our capability are intimidating. 
The operational concept of maritime denial makes well-understood 
demands on air capabilities. First, they need independently to be able to 
secure command of the air over Australia’s maritime approaches and the 
approaches to Australia’s immediate neighbours, and to strike targets at 
sea and on land within our wider maritime approaches. Secondly, they 
need to be able to deploy substantial forces to undertake the same kinds 
of operations as part of a coalition in wider Asia-Pacific contingencies.
The problems begin when we consider what that requires. 
qualitatively, the air force must be able to do all these tasks against the 
kinds of forces that China and other Asian major powers will develop 
over coming decades. quantitatively, it must be able to achieve them 
independently against the scale of forces that a major power like China 
could deploy and sustain into Australia’s neighbourhood, as well as to 
send large enough forces to make an operationally effective contribution 
to a US-led coalition in a major Asian crisis. These constitute the twin 
benchmarks which Australia’s combat air capabilities must meet. 
A lot more is involved in these capabilities than the combat aircraft 
themselves, but the government’s choices about the future of the air 
force will be framed by the decisions it makes about the replacements 
for the F-18 and F-111 fleets, and that is what we will focus on here.
Both the quality and the quantity of new aircraft deserve careful 
thinking. The Howard Government’s adoption of more ambitious 
strategic objectives in 2000 drove the decision to replace the F-18s and 
F-111s with fifth-generation aircraft — the Joint Strike Fighter. As 
we have seen, the JSF was expected to restore a margin of superiority 
over potential major-power aircraft that was wide enough and durable 
enough to provide viable strategic options against forces like China’s 
for decades to come. Since then the picture has become more complex. 
First, Chinese capabilities have improved faster than expected, and it 
is only prudent to assume that this trend will continue. Several factors 
are at work here: the PLA has proved better than expected at exploiting 
the Russian systems bought since the early 1990s, the Russians are 
upgrading their systems faster than expected, and China’s indigenous 
capacity to develop sophisticated new systems of its own has increased 
faster than expected too. Some of the same can be said of other major 
Asian powers also.
Secondly, the JSF may not be as good as we hoped. A review conducted 
by the new government early last year affirmed the JSF as the best 
option now available, but that is unlikely to be the end of the matter. 
If the JSF’s costs grow, if its capability does not meet expectations or if 
delivery lags, close attention will have to be paid to other options. There 
is no chance of resolving any of these issues in time for this year's White 
Paper, and it would be foolish to try. The government should, however, 
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make clear its determination to acquire a fleet of combat aircraft that 
can meet the benchmarks identified above, keep its options open about 
how best to do this, and commit funding to acquire whatever types of 
aircraft are required, in the numbers needed. 
The current plan is to buy about 100 JSF. There is nothing sacred 
about that number. It was determined by simple addition: 71 F-18s 
plus about 25-odd F-111s equals about 100. In 2000 that looked like 
a lot, but not today. Australia’s air combat forces need to be able to do 
many different things in many different places at once, and they need 
to sustain operations for months, if not years. Against highly-capable 
adversaries they would take serious losses. Much more careful study is 
required to determine how many aircraft or what types we should buy. 
In this year’s White Paper the government should commit itself to do 
that work, recognising that the arbitrary figure of 100 aircraft is almost 
certainly too low, and foreshadow long-term defence funding sufficient 
to acquire twice that number. Again, this number of 200 fifth-generation 
combat aircraft might seem surprising; like the submarine numbers 
discussed earlier, it implies a different approach to developing the ADF 
from that which we have been used to for many decades. No one should 
be surprised that fundamental changes in our strategic circumstances 
require fundamental changes in our force structure. Nor should they be 
surprised if they have big implications for the national budget.  
Chapter 6
Money
The force-structure choices set out in the previous chapter bring us back 
to the basic question of defence policy that we sketched in Chapter 1: 
how to balance our perceptions of strategic risk against our willingness 
to spend money? A Defence White Paper is, above all, an opportunity 
to reconsider that question. In the light of issues we have canvassed so 
far, do we choose risk or cost?
A lot of money
Today Australia spends about $22 billion per year on defence. By most 
standards that is a lot of money — it’s over $1000 for every person in the 
country, and it has grown by over 3% per annum for the last 10 years. 
But viewed another way it is not that much. It is 2% of Australia’s 
GDP. Looking at defence spending as a share of GDP can be misleading, 
but it does provide a basis for comparison with other places and other 
times. Look at other times first. In Australia, defence has held steady 
at around 2% of GDP (in fact between 2.1 % and 1.8%) for the last 20 
years.38 But that is lower than at any time since before World War II. 
Defence spending stabilised at that 2% after 20 years of gradual decline 
from about 3% of GDP in 1970. Before then, in the 1950s and 1960s, 
it averaged 3.2%. And even in the 1980s it averaged over 2.3%. So our 
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defence spending as a share of GDP remains well below historical levels. 
This defence-spending trajectory is easily explained, of course. In the 
1950s and 1960s Australia perceived distinct and substantial strategic 
risks, and spent money in response. After 1970 those risks seemed to 
ease, and slowly, in response, defence spending fell too until about 1990. 
Then over the 1990s and 2000s a gradually increasing sense of strategic 
risk halted the decline, but was not sufficient to reverse it.
This is a good way to frame the defence-funding choices which the 
government faces in the new White Paper. Today ministers are fixated 
on the huge fiscal consequences of the global economic crisis, which 
for once make the defence budget look like small change. It will be 
hard for ministers to step back from the sea of red ink flowing over the 
forward estimates and consider defence funding in a 10 and even 20-
year timeframe, but it is essential that they should. The contemporary 
fiscal situation is only marginally relevant to the big decisions that 
are needed about the shape of our future armed forces, because those 
decisions will be implemented and paid for 10 and 20 years from now. 
The big question is not what defence should get in the 2009-10 budget. 
It is whether the government should decide to reverse the long-term 
trend and begin to build defence spending as a share of GDP again, as 
Australia’s strategic risks grow. The argument presented in this paper 
explains why the choice is so stark: we cannot afford the capabilities 
to achieve the objectives that would help us manage emerging strategic 
risks at 2% of GDP.
We can explore this issue from another direction by looking at what 
other countries do. The middle range for defence/GDP ratios is around 
2%. What kinds of countries spend more? Mark Thomson has observed 
that they fall into a few clear categories. There are the nuclear-armed 
major (and former major) powers. There are the countries that face 
clear and imminent strategic threats, like Israel and South Korea. And 
there are countries which live in complex neighbourhoods and face 
substantial but strategic risks short of imminent threat, and want armed 
forces that can make a real contribution to managing those threats. The 
countries that spend 2% of GDP or less either live in stable regions 
with low strategic risks, or have decided from necessity or choice not to 
build forces that can do much to manage the risks they may face. Other than 
Japan, no country that faces serious strategic risk and expects its armed 
forces to help manage that risk spends as little as 2% or less of GDP.39
Not enough
Mark Thomson’s work on the long-term drivers of Australian defence 
spending neatly shows the deeper trends at work.40 He has both good 
and bad news. The good news is that for the next 40 years or so Australia 
can afford to maintain the kind of force we have today — the Balanced 
Force, kept more or less up to date — by spending about the same share 
of GDP as we spend today. The bad news is that this is all we can expect 
to do: substantial increases in the strategic weight of our forces will cost 
substantially more than 2%.
We should not be surprised at this. It reflects deep, durable trends 
in Australia’s international position, specifically its relative strategic 
potential, by which I mean the basic capacity to build and maintain 
armed forces. Different countries draw their strategic potential from 
different sources: some from huge populations, some from strong 
economies, some from exceptional technologies or the superior training 
and élan of their people, and some from favourable geography. For 
Australia, the most important of these has been our relative economic 
strength, which has made up for our small population and allowed us to 
exploit the advantages offered by geography. We tend to underestimate 
how much of an advantage this has been, and to overlook how quickly 
it is eroding. When the 1987 White Paper consolidated Australia’s post-
Vietnam defence posture and entrenched the Balanced Force, ours was 
the second-largest economy in Asia after Japan: larger than China’s 
and larger than India’s. How remote that seems today; how swiftly the 
balance of strategic potential has shifted over the past 22 years, and 
how much further it might shift in the next few decades. This really 
puts our strategic predicament in perspective: the combination of 
declining relative economic weight and increasing strategic risk present 
an inescapable choice between spending more money and accepting 
more risk.
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On the other hand there is no need to be fatalistic. While it would 
be hard for Australia to build and sustain forces to achieve the kinds of 
strategic objectives we have been discussing, it is not impossible. For a 
start, we have enough people for the kinds of forces we need. Recruitment 
and retention are endemic problems in the management of our forces, but 
that does not reflect any underlying demographic limitations. Throughout 
the next half-century there will be about two million Australians between 
18 and 25. On past trends, we need to recruit a little over 100 people a 
year for every 1000 people in the ADF. That means we need about 6000 
recruits a year to maintain an ADF of 50,000. To sustain a larger force 
of say 75,000 would mean finding 9000 people each year from a pool of 
two million. That cannot be too hard, nor is there any reason to think 
that among that large pool we could not find the qualities required for 
the pilots, submariners and soldiers of the future. If recruitment limits 
our ability to build the kinds of forces proposed in the previous chapter, 
mismanagement and not demographics will be to blame.
A more critical limit would be technology. As long as we have assured 
privileged access to US technology and support in operations, then this 
problem is manageable. If that assurance fades, as it might, Australia 
will face some very tough questions. Could we maintain the kind of 
regionally-competitive air and naval systems which our operational 
priorities require on our own? The experience of recent decades is 
highly discouraging. Australia has a poor record in developing and 
maintaining the technological expertise needed to buy, build and operate 
sophisticated military systems. Decades of policymaking have failed to 
address this problem, or even grapple with it effectively, in part because 
the interests of stakeholders can so easily elbow aside the long-term 
strategic issues at stake. A lot more work is needed here.    
But the biggest constraint would be money. The key question of course 
is how much?  Andrew Davies has calculated that to build and maintain 
a force somewhat like the one suggested in the previous chapter would 
cost around 2.5% of Australia GDP over the longer term.41 Such forces 
are not unaffordable, and indeed they might cost only a little more than 
we were spending in the 1980s and rather less than our parents spent 
in the 1950s and 1960s.
Of course, any long-term increase in defence spending carries serious 
costs for the economy. Defence spending, like any other spending, has 
a multiplier effect, but it does not constitute productive investment, in 
the critical sense that it does not contribute to the creation of further 
wealth. Defence spending is more or less pure consumption, and to the 
extent that defence spending diverts money from investment, it carries 
a large and enduring opportunity cost which governments, and voters, 
should not forget about — and won’t.
Having said this, there is not much doubt that we could afford this 
kind of long-term investment in defence, in the sense that spending at 
the level of 2.5%, or even a bit more, would not undermine our long-
term economic prospects. We spent more in the boom decades of the 
1950s and 1960s, and many highly successful countries also spend more. 
In other words, Australia could afford to spend this kind of money on 
defence. But the fiscal implications would be substantial, and they could 
only be sustained with the electorate if successive governments were 
willing to explain in detail why it was needed and how it is being spent.
Efficiency
Ministers would hardly be human if they did not look for ways to avoid 
doing this. The most common tactic is to assert that the forces we need 
can be built by improving efficiency rather than spending more money. 
This has been a constant refrain for decades. The Rudd Government, 
like all its predecessors, places great hopes on their ability to bridge 
the gap between current budgets and future needs through efficiency 
reforms. Their hopes that their defence-policy dilemmas could be 
dissolved in this time-honoured way were reflected in their decision 
to incorporate a dozen or more Companion Reviews into the White 
Paper process, supported by a major external consultants’ report. These 
reviews have examined almost every major aspect of the way defence 
does business to find ways to save money, and they claim to have 
succeeded. It would be unsurprising if the government announced that, 
as a result, Australia can build the forces it needs without spending 
more than we have already planned to do.   
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I am sceptical, for two reasons. First, Australia’s defence effort 
today is extremely inefficient, but fixing those inefficiencies will not be 
sufficient to bridge the gap between current spending and future needs. 
Secondly, I doubt that the government’s defence reform agenda will 
deliver significant efficiencies of any kind. To explain this scepticism, 
it helps to go back to basics. The efficiency of Australia’s defence effort 
depends on two quite separate issues. The first is whether we are 
buying the right capabilities — the ones that can achieve our strategic 
objectives most cost-effectively. The second is whether those capabilities 
themselves are being delivered as cost-effectively as possible. When 
people talk about defence efficiency, they usually focus on the second 
question, but the first is almost certainly more important. A lot more 
money is wasted by building the wrong capabilities than by building the 
right capabilities inefficiently.
This means that the first essential step to improving efficiency in 
defence is to make sure we are developing the right kinds of forces in 
the first place. And yet these decisions are made with less care and 
diligence than many others in defence — as the decision to buy the Air 
Warfare Destroyer shows. There are many reasons for this, but they all 
come down to leadership. No one in defence or the government accepts 
responsibility to ensure that good decisions are made about these biggest 
and most important issues. Ministers assume that Russell Hill knows 
best; senior officers assume that their staffs have worked it out; and the 
staffs assume that their superiors have worked out how it is all supposed 
to fit together. Major decisions worth billions of dollars and with immense 
opportunity costs are made without anyone knowing exactly why. Any 
serious defence efficiency program must start by addressing this problem, 
to which there is only one solution: direct and forceful leadership from 
ministers. They must themselves take responsibility for ensuring that 
these momentous decisions are made with due diligence. The new White 
Paper will itself be a test of this: will ministers be content to sign off on a 
Defence Capability Plan sent over from Russell Hill, or will they take the 
time and trouble needed to take the decisions themselves?  
Of course this is not the only problem. It is widely known that 
defence remains deeply inefficient at delivering capability, and most 
observers believe that it is easy to find the waste and fix it. This is 
what the Pappas Review and the White Paper’s Companion Reviews 
are meant to do. But one should always look twice at claims that large, 
sustained, painless savings are there for the asking. First, the orchard 
has already been picked over. Throughout the 1990s, under both Labor 
and Liberal governments, defence was subject to intense and at times 
stringent scrutiny. Some important reforms were made, and they picked 
the low-hanging fruit. Some of that has grown back and can be harvested 
again, but much of the rest would require deeper changes which for one 
reason or another seemed too hard back then, and will often seem no 
easier now.
Secondly, large and sustainable efficiency savings are certainly 
possible in defence, but they won’t be found at the margins. Strategically 
significant savings will not be achieved by staff cuts, travel freezes, 
supplier contract renegotiations or other easy measures. Nor will they 
be found by cutting the generals’ entitlements to drivers and batmen. 
They can only be achieved by major changes in the way the organisation 
does core business. Not even defence is so badly managed that there 
are large savings to be made in core business process without major 
changes to the way defence performs the biggest, most important and 
therefore most sensitive elements of its business. The way defence does 
things often seems strange to outsiders, but every element of defence’s 
core business processes is vigorously supported by plausible arguments 
which cannot lightly be dismissed. Reforms like that can only be made by 
people who understand the business well enough to judge the arguments, 
balance the risks and benefits of radical change, identity the most cost-
effective solution, and impose their decision on a reluctant organisation.
This is not a job for consultants. It requires much closer engagement 
with the detail of defence business than is ever possible from external 
reviews. Like better capability decisions, more efficient capability 
delivery must come from the leadership of the defence organisation 
itself. For many years now there have been deep doubts about how well 
defence is led — by ministers, civilian officials and military officers 
alike. Defence will only become more efficient when it is better led, and 
that is ultimately a question for the prime minister. Until he addresses 
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this, and delivers decisively better defence leadership, we should expect 
little of any efficiency reforms. And even if better leadership transforms 
Russell Hill, the hard choice will remain: do we spend more on defence 
or do we allow our strategic risks to grow?
Epilogue
A political question
Every big policy question is also, equally, a political question. Politics 
will frame the policy choices we have explored here, and shape the 
decisions in many ways. This will not make them easier. Last year Ross 
Garnaut wondered whether Australia’s political processes were capable 
of dealing effectively with the challenge of climate change. It may be ‘too 
hard for rational policy-making in Australia’, he suggested. ‘The issues 
are too complex, the vested interests surrounding it are too numerous 
and intense, the relevant timeframes are too long’.42 The same could very 
easily be said of the strategic challenges which Australia faces as the 
foundations of our security in Asia shift beneath our feet. It is not clear 
that our political process can produce an effective response. Most people 
understand that China’s rise is transforming Asia, but few acknowledge 
the obvious consequences for Australia’s security. It is hard, especially 
for a Labor government, to cast any doubt on the permanent centrality 
of the US alliance to Australia’s security. It is hard to acknowledge the 
strategic risks that Australia might face in Asia as China grows. It is hard 
for any government facing an intense financial crisis to foreshadow big 
increases in defence spending for decades to come.  
Still we can take comfort from history. Australia has faced major 
strategic change before. In the late 19th century, men like Alfred Deakin 
recognised that Britain’s decline affected Australia’s security, and in 
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response they created the Federation, and sought a new relationship 
with America. After 1945, European power in Asia was destroyed and 
a new Asia of independent states emerged. Men like Percy Spender and 
Richard Casey created a new Australian foreign and strategic policy 
to address this new situation, and new military capabilities to match. 
After the collapse of Forward Defence in the late 1960s, leaders like 
Malcolm Fraser saw clearly that a major new approach would be needed 
in the wake of the Guam Doctrine and Britain’s final withdrawal East 
of Suez.  
Kevin Rudd and his colleagues face a comparable set of challenges 
today. They will need to decide whether, in the Asian century, Australia 
seeks to command the independent strategic weight of a middle power, 
or whether we will fall back into the ranks of small powers that lack 
the ability to meet threats with armed force if necessary. It is an old 
and true maxim of defence policy that there are limits to Australia’s 
defence capacity and influence, but the extent of those limits are — to 
some degree — up to us as a community, and the government on our 
behalf, to decide.  
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